This paper analyses the perceptions of media freedom and responsibility by journalists and politicians in South Korea during the Presidency of Roh Moo-huyn (2003-8). It draws on indepth interviews with ten journalists and ten politicians with different political affiliations and interests. Findings suggest that both groups had positive appraisals of the country's media democratisation. For them the media could function as a watchdog on political power without having to fear direct political reprisals for doing so. However, the political press remained partially shackled to specific legacies and economic conditions. The most pressing example is 
Introduction
South Korea's transition from an authoritarian and military to democratic and civilian political system is recognised as a successful example of 'Third Wave' processes in East Asia (Huntington, 1991; Chu et al., 2001; Brazinsky, 2016) . Constitutional revisions in 1987, generally considered as the beginning of democratisation, permitted free and direct Presidential elections that paved the way for conservative Kim Young-sam's victory in 1992. In 1997, the election to the presidency of liberal Kim Dae-jung marked the first peaceful transfer of power from the dominant conservative forces to progressive political parties. Kim was succeeded by Roh Moo-hyun (elected in 2002) , and both presidencies were confronted by stalled economic growth, unemployment and social inequality. In 2007 the electorate chose the conservative former mayor of Seoul, Lee Myung-bak as President. Lee was a hugely unpopular President, with ratings that tumbled to just 20 percent after he was accused of corruption. In December 2012, South Korea's democracy passed yet another significant milestone when conservative party candidate Park Geun-hye, daughter of former dictator Park Cheung-hee 1 , was elected as the country's first female President, with a vote share of 51.55 percent of the vote -the highest share won by any candidate since 1987.
With political power shifting first from the military to civilian government, and from conservative to progressive parties, and then from progressive parties to conservative parties, the consolidation of South Korea's democratic political culture continues.
Assessing the current political landscape, Brazinsky (2016) concludes that South Korea's democracy is imperfect but continues to evolve. This imperfection, common in juvenile democracies, provides the context for understanding the issues confronting political journalists and their relationship with political elites in the Roh (2003 Roh ( -2008 era. This 3 timeframe is chosen because it sheds light on how structural instability (e.g. economic fragility) and the turnover of power between conservative and liberal forces and the inner power struggles of both forces can impact on the way journalists see their own role and their relationship with political actors, processes, institutions, and culture. Recognising the role of political journalism in consolidating South Korea's democracy, this paper analyses the perceptions of journalists and politicians about the democratic transition to arrive at a more nuanced, comprehensive and balanced understanding of the political communication system in this country.
Theoretical foundation
Political communications are central to both the development and sustenance of a democratic culture, processes, and institutions. In competitive democracies, journalists and politicians are two sets of mutually adaptive and dependent actors working in a framework of political communication marked by both conflicts and co-operation (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995) . Within this system, the practices of these actors are regulated by a set of orientations, values, attitudes and role expectations (Pfetsch, 2004; Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012) . These orientations and attitudinal underpinnings of journalists and politicians constitute the cultural dimension that 'complements the structural conditions and constraints in which political communication actors operate' (Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012: 390) , and govern the everyday interactions between these two groups. These informal but complex values and expectations are constitutive of a 'political communication culture', which is defined as:
the empirically observable orientations of actors in the system of production of political messages toward specific objects of political communication, which 4 determine the manner in which political actors and media actors communicate in relation to their common political public (Pfetsch, 2004: 348) . Pfetsch and Voltmer (2012: 390) also argue that the understanding of political communication culture as the orientations and mutual expectations of politicians and journalists needs to be contextualised in specific political and media backgrounds (Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012: 390) . 2 Therefore we further draw on Hallin and Macini's (2004) work that proposes to examine four main aspects -state, market, pluralism and professionalismto study media transformation. We investigate the democratic transition of the media system in South Korea by analysing the attitudinal and perceptual indicators of journalists and politicians including their evaluation of/attitudes towards media independence in relation to government and market, their perceptions/expectations of own professional roles and of roles of the opposite group, and their assessment of the relationship between the two groups.
While in established democracies the understanding of the news production processes, the perceptions of professional roles, and the relationship between the two groups are relatively stable based on predictable expectations, in new democracies the expectations are less certain. This is not surprising given that communications have performed an assortment of roles in authoritarian political systems, and that the transition may occur at an unexpectedly brisk pace, leaving communications requiring time to rebuild and negotiate new social and political roles. As there is a lack of clarity of the 'degree of collaboration and autonomy, publicity and secrecy, or advocacy and detachment' (Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012: 392) 
Media development in South Korea after democratic transition
While the democratic transition in South Korea did not take place overnight, its media certainly proliferated at a remarkably fast pace after the introduction of democratic reforms (Kwak, 2012) . Between 1979 and 1993 the number of published daily newspapers increased three-fold from just 26 to 112 (Korean Press Institution, 1994) . The broadcast media likewise expanded with 24 television channels and 50 regional operators in 1997 (Lee, 1997 On the other hand, oligopolistic ownership remains one of the main challenges to Korean media and their contribution to the democratic society (Lee, 1997; Park et al., 2000) . In the broadcasting sector, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) account for more than 80 percent of the market share;
while three conservative newspapers -the Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo and Dong-A Ilbo -6 dominate 74 percent of the total daily newspaper market (Kim and Johnson, 2009 ) with a combined circulation of 6.9 million copies. The development of new technologies (Internet) together with aggressive competition between the three major newspapers to capture a share of the same general readership and advertising revenue (income from advertising accounts for 70 percent of revenue for newspapers) has led to a loss of subscription and readership in the newspaper industry (Kwak, 2012: 74) .
The developments that feature market liberation as well as concentration have created conditions for journalists to re-negotiate their professional values. They question their purpose and responsibilities in the political arrangements of a new democracy, and consider how their professional obligations and practices correspond to both the expectations of the market, audiences and political sources, and the specific socio-cultural context in which they work. The consequences of market competition, restricted ownership patterns and media competition, together with a decidedly partisan and therefore adversarial press often result in a 'journalistic culture of scandal' (Voltmer and Rawnsley, 2009: 245) . Such conditions can provoke highly charged debates about public trust in, and the authority of political actors, institutions and the media. This is particularly so in new democracies where the media may encourage a greater identification with, and civic participation in, political processes; but when they question the media's commitment to professional values of objectivity and detachment, voters and political actors may also observe the press as a powerful negative influence in an otherwise democratic culture (see analysis of Bulgarian media, Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012) .
Research design 7
This research is based on twenty in-depth interviews. Ten interviewees are described as mid-career and senior journalists/editors from national newspapers representing the conservative-neutral-progressive political spectrum, as well as the online news media, the broadcasting industry and the Korean news agencies. A further ten interviews were with early/mid-career politicians from the dominant political parties (five from the Conservative party and five were from the progressive parties). 3 The interview schedule is informed by
Hallin and Mancini's analytical framework for comparing media systems, focusing on three main aspects: the political economic context of the media system including mediamarket/state relationship, professional norms (perception of the actors' own role and of others and standards of news production), the relationship between the media and politicians (mutual perceptions and evaluation and rules and experiences of interaction).
Both journalists and politicians were included in this study based a framework of interactions conceptualised by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995 (Pfetsch, 2004) .
Democratic Change and the Media's Watchdog Role
The first questions asked in our interviews focused on the understanding of South Korea's political system and especially the successful transition to democracy. It is important to recall that these interviews occurred in 2008 after an election that transferred power to a conservative president during a time of economic fragility, and after President
Roh's impeachment. The journalists and politicians were unanimous in expressing support for the idea of democracy, as well as the institutions and processes of democratic politics, though they expressed scepticism about several specific features of the political system. In particular, both sets of actors identified the introduction of civilian-led government as the most prominent development. They also discussed their views of other aspects of democratic politics, including free elections, human and civil rights, economic growth and cultural diversity. Although critics argue that the election system was later distorted by the Lee Myung-bak government (Haggard and You, 2015; Jonsson, 2014) , This journalist's final sentence is revealing. As we shall see presently, freedom of expression and its relationship to media responsibility emerged at this time as a contested arena among politicians and journalists. Moreover, a range of dissenting voices questioned the democratic expansion of the media space. 5 For example, Lee (1997) is critical of the prevalence of pre-democracy values, cultures and hierarchies that shape practices in newsrooms, as well as the relationship between political elites and the media. Lee concludes that 'the perceived freedom has not fundamentally expanded from the days of the predemocratization era' (Lee, 1997: 145) . Nevertheless, the current research reveals a broad consensus among both sets of actors that democratisation encouraged the development of a more open and inclusive media system. This historical perspective provides the context for the narratives offered by journalists and politicians:
In the past the media in South Korea was under dictatorial government control.
The military governments limited the number of newspapers to one per province. Furthermore, they introduced a licensing system. So, during the days of the license system, the government's permission was required to set up a newspaper outlet, whereas today only registration is required (J2).
Some politicians highlighted the free legal framework for media institutions (P3) and the role of the independent media as public watchdogs, emphasising their power in providing balances and checks. P9 said 'compared to the past, the media now are doing relatively a good job in monitoring the government...Admitting that some media have agitated the government, I
would say the media have also contributed to making the government more reliable by monitoring it'. The comment reflects the interviewee's evaluation of the role of the media in 2008 , but Freedom House (2014 argues that the Lee Myung-Bak government (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) posed considerable threat to press freedom through its censorship of online content and news from North Korea for 'national security' reasons. Others also value the watchdog role of the media, considering even the opposition between conservative and progressive newspapers as a contribution to a 'better society' because each group are 'holding each other in checking, presenting different opinions respectively' (P8). Here the interviewee perceived the existence of ideological confrontation in the media system as a progress of South Korea's democratic change. As we will demonstrate in the next section, distorted media practices generated by such ideological competition were perceived in a negative light by other interviewees. The above evaluations show that the interviewees oriented their attitudes based on their judgements of the past, and they evaluated the media landscape in democratic Korea against the political system's transformation.
Moreover, the historical perspective also helped influence perceptions of the media as agents of social change. In particular, the media's support for the opposition movement in the 1970s and 1980s was cited as evidence for their contribution to democratisation. One journalist described how in the 1970s the press were a 'positive influence on democratisation' by exposing daily the abuses by the authoritarian government (J6). A politician claimed 'democracy in Korea would have been impossible without the assistance of the media,' and disclosed the way Korean people trust the media (P5).
In the meantime, perceived editorial control exercised by media proprietors continued to influence political journalism (Youm, 1994; Lee, 1997; Sa, 2009; Woo-Young, 2005) .
Many interviewees in the present study observed structural constraints on the democratic performance of the media, including their funding mechanisms, the oligopolistic structures of ownership, party-press parallelism and the way some owners and editors insist on interfering in editorial decisions:
The monopoly of the media market by the conservative media can be a threat to the freedom of expression. Another threat is the heavy dependence of the media on advertising revenue. … It is not easy for them to survive without advertisements from large companies … it is not easy for the media to keep their editorial freedom from the influence of capital (J3). Politicians from conservative parties also recognised the pressure that the media received from influential advertisers:
Under the situation where the power of capital has a great influence on the media and where the media market has been dominated by a few major newspaper conglomerates with specific political and ideological tendencies, the media at present tend to fall short of fulfilling its fundamental role as society's watchdog (P6).
One journalist reflected on his own work and connected the prevailing economic constraints to his ability to do his work: 'I don't think I am doing a good job,' he confessed. 'The number one obstacle is the need to make a living. Because I am the breadwinner of my family … it is difficult for me to act freely and with conviction as I did in the past when I 13 was younger' (J7). The influence of capital on print media in post-transition Korea is widely recognised, and the alignment between corporate power and the three dominant conservative newspapers became more noticeable after the economic recession of the 1990s when the overall media market suffered from shrinking advertising revenues (Kwak, 2012: 70-90; Sa, 2009 ). Progressive newspapers and local media in particular faced financial difficulties due to the lack of advertising revenue from big businesses:
The P1 gave a specific example of Kyunghyang Daily, which was separated from a conglomerate (Hanwha Group) in 1990s but has been in financial difficulties ever since.
While some of our interviewees considered the lack of funding for progressive newspapers as a drawback for the media's responsibility to be representative, the online media, as mentioned here, were 'less dependent on capital' (P1) and were perceived as the greatest opportunity for democratic political communication in South Korea. The growth of online platforms with their smaller running cost provided new channels for progressive voices to challenge the domination of conservatism in the media; while the expansion online of interest groups and civil society activity provided new platforms for popular political participation and engagement (Kim, 2006; Kern and Nam, 2009; Leung and Lee, 2014) . This was most noticeable during demonstrations held to protest President Lee's decision to overturn restrictions on American beef imports. The Internet and mobile telephone text 14 messaging were used to help organise the demonstration and facilitate civil participation, which was not adequately supported by political parties or mainstream media (Oh, 2016: 191) .
Freedom of expression has greatly expanded. Each individual in our society is actively expressing her/his views… since 2000, as a solid Internet infrastructure has been built, people could easily enjoy freedom of expression (J3).
The online media have also reshaped the offline media environment. This is most visible in the online news provider, OhmyNews, which defies the conservative bias found in the offline media with its army of volunteer reporters and its operating slogan, 'All citizens are reporters' (Kim, 2006) .
Chosun Ilbo has held a pride in that "anything not written by the Chosun Ilbo is Hence there is evidence of a growing consensus that the Internet helped reinforce the importance of public opinion, as one journalist noted: 'These days, besides public opinion surveys, it is possible to assess public opinion by reading the comments on the internet' (J3).
Another explained how the Internet contributed to a more plural media sphere and therefore challenged the conservative media's domination of information flows (J9). Moreover, politicians habitually use the Internet -emails, websites and online discussion forums -to 16 communicate with their constituents, and release news and information:
Once the issue attracts the attention of the people, and more and more users become involved in online discussions, we can lead them to … form their own opinions… It takes time to share and encourage discussions about the issues, but once they [the discussions] appear, the effect can be great.
… [T]he power of the Internet to spread [opinion] is incredible (P9).
One of the most interesting dimensions of our interviews is that both sets of actors representing all shades of political opinion started to evaluate the performance of Korea's
Internet-based political journalism by the criteria used to assess the efficacy of offline reporting: objectivity, impartiality and accuracy. This new situation raised a number of important issues that are now prominent in all democracies, namely how to define a journalist, and is it possible to apply to the Internet news media the regulations and laws that control offline media? One journalist noted in interview: 'There were many cases in which reports [on internet news sites] not based on facts … were spewed out indiscriminately, thereby pushing public sentiment in an awkward direction …' (J2). Another journalist (J4) maintained that the Internet media that engaged in so called 'exposé journalism' should be restricted. The reservations expressed in our interviews about the Internet media as impartial, independent and objective agents of political communication are also relevant to the discussion of freedom of expression and media responsibility. We will return to this point in more detail in the next section.
Contested Freedoms of Expression and Media Responsibility
Notwithstanding the largely positive attitudes that reflect support for South Korea's democracy and media freedoms, our interviews reveal that political change opened new areas of contestation. The discrepancies between the aspirations and the performance of democratic journalism correlate with the gap that Youm (1994) observed between 'press freedom' and 'journalistic freedom'. The former is unchallenged; as we have seen, the new liberal democratic culture imparted a commitment to the idea of press freedom. However, 'journalistic freedom' refers to the routines and practices that inform the day-to-day work of In the past … the media had a tendency to ruthlessly criticise and argue against the government. It was, at the time, an obvious and an absolutely necessary thing to do. Yet, there are some media groups that consider it to be valid even today, as if it represents freedom of speech. The habit of being trapped … to recklessly criticise the nation and government is a convention of an undemocratic past (J1).
The media can often be over-enthusiastic to prove that freedom of speech and of the 18 press must be absolute, while in more mature democracies the norms and routines of journalists and their relationship with their political sources have benefited from the passage of time and continuous negotiation. One Korean politician claimed that the media 'enjoy too much freedom…the media seem to think that they even have the right to infringe one's private life and to deliver information no matter it is true or not. I think the media need to be more responsible' (P8). This is certainly a reflection one journalist (J4) agreed with, deeming some online 'exposé journalism' undignified, concluding that freedoms to publish such stories should be restricted. While J3 noted how the media 'tend to be too sensational, inflammatory and excessive in monitoring the government's performance', other concerns were more serious with some interviewees suggesting that the media often fabricated their stories to follow a particular political agenda:
[XX] nominated me as [YY] , but the National Assembly did not endorse the appointment. I think it was because the media distorted some facts. Previous research on the media in mature liberal-democracies suggests that there is a strong correlation between sensationalism and market competition (Sparks and Tulloch, 2000) . Our research on the relationship between journalists and politicians in Taiwan, an
East Asian society where the transition to democracy occurred at almost exactly the same time as in South Korea, demonstrates how fierce competition in a highly saturated media market can result in rising sensationalism and a marked deterioration in the quality of political journalism (Authors). In South Korea too, both sets of actors cited media commercialism and competition as key explanations for the structural problems facing the media at the time of the interviews:
The newspapers sometimes criticise politicians … to increase the number of subscribers. They know that is the easiest way to attract the audience (P4).
[Democratisation] allowed for the uncontrolled birth of many newspapers and a … fierce competition for survival. … the newspapers freely criticise the government without appraisal. However, as the newspapers became more and more sensational due to the fierce competition among them, people seem to feel that the information provided … was less and less reliable (J2).
Clearly both politicians and journalists believed that the expansion of sensationalism in South Korea's political journalism, including the mounting emphasis on drama, personality and emotion, damaged the public's trust in the media. While more mature democracies are accustomed to such claims and have established formal and informal mechanisms to deal with them, this is unfamiliar territory for South Korea and was not identified by previous studies (Lee, 1997) . This situation raises important questions about the sustainability of serious political journalism in juvenile democratic societies (Tsai et al., 2008: ; Authors) .
More notably, claims about media sensationalism reflect contested norms and routines of journalism, including the commitment to objectivity and impartiality:
The media tend to make someone a star and another a total fool. They don't 20 focus on whether a politician is a true servant, that is, [they don't ask] what are his political beliefs, whether he is going down the right path and such, but the media tend to depict politicians as gossips. I think that kind of media practice will only result in distrust of the media … Sometimes it is not easy for the media to be fair and impartial, as each media outlet is also an organisation that must pursue its own benefits and interests. However, such practices … just degrade [the media's] authority (P5).
These comments suggest the influence of a wide range of interconnected factors on the practices and performance of political journalism. Although all of the interviewees supported the changes to the media environment made possible by the transition to democracy, they nevertheless expressed serious reservations about the presence of media bias; and while they all noted that the growth of a more progressive and middle class voice in the media challenged the prevailing conservatism (Han, 2000) , most interviewees were critical of the way a small group of conservative media still appear to dominate (notably JoongAng, Dong-A, Chosun and KBS). Citing high-profile reports about imports of US beef that was alleged to contain Mad Cow Disease, our interviewees once again raised the problem of media ownership control, this time highlighting the relationship between media responsibility and issues of public interest:
The conservative newspapers, such as the Chosun Ilbo, the JoongAng Ilbo, and the Dong-A Ilbo, insisted that the arguments were made by anti-American groups and radical leftist groups. While people were concerned about whether the US beef were safe enough to eat, the conservative media made this issue into a political one and argued that all the protests were stirred up by the leftists (P2).
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Recently, almost all of the media seems to be focusing on the Korea-U.S FTA and on the beef market issue...I think conservative newspapers, however, are releasing articles that only speak for the government, whereas progressive newspapers are doing the opposite, but only to incite anti-government sentiment through exaggeration. It's a pity that there is no media that stands between these two extremes (P6).
However, we must note that political bias is not confined to either the left or the right, as we see from the above quotes. Rather, the new 'marketplace of ideas,' representing the ideological confrontation between both sides of the political spectrum, is considered a potential threat to Korean democracy by politicians from both sides:
The … conflict between the left and the right is … an obstacle to healthy debate toll on public support for democracy' (Chu et al., 2001: 130) . Further survey data highlight that in 1997, Koreans had low levels of trust in Parliament (22 percent) and political parties (20 percent), and that this is in marked contrast to the levels of popular trust in the courts (57 percent) and the military (72 percent). These levels of trust can be explained by a range of factors: political scandals and internal conflicts with political parties may be reasons to be suspicious of politicians and political institutions (Baek et al., 2016) , while the presence and behaviour of North Korea may contribute to relatively high levels of trust in the military (Chu et al., 2001: 130) . In 2015, the trust in Parliament and government reached lower levels at 17.4% and 33.2% respectively (Jung, 2015: 30-31) , possibly due to a public perception that insufficient government efforts were made in sustaining economic growth and reducing poverty and inequality. However, it is essential to note that distrust of political actors and institutions does not imply a rejection of democratic processes. Rather, it may reflect popular unease with the performance of democratic institutions (Chu et al., 2001: 131) . This is consistent with the results of the present study: both journalists and politicians supported the idea, ideals and principles of democracy, but were less content 24 with the way it works in Korea.
Conclusions
The political press in all democracies -juvenile and mature -share similar concerns about their responsibilities, professional routines and obligations, and also question their interactions with political sources. In new democracies like South Korea, these concerns are magnified by the ambiguity of media norms and the continuous re-negotiation of roles and positions of the press and politicians towards each other and the news-consuming public. For
Korean journalists this is particularly challenging since polls reveal that the popular evaluation of their accuracy, fairness and credibility is at an all-time low (Korean Press Foundation cited by Kwak, 2012: 9) . The interviewees for this project referred many times to 'western' news media, especially the BBC and CNN as model broadcasting systems to emulate. Hence, while the interviews reveal that politicians and journalists in South Korea may understand how the media can assist the evolution of political society and culture, they are also aware of the current system's shortcomings. It is widely recognised among our interviewees, regardless of their political affiliations, that the post-transition media challenged the intervention of the military government, and that the media now enjoy much more press freedom, performing a watchdog role in political society. Their views, usually shaped by a historical perspective, support the findings of earlier studies on media and democracy in South Korea (Heuvel and Dennis, 1993; Youm, 1994) . However although the political influence from the military government has declined, pressure arising from funding mechanisms and ownership control was increasingly acknowledged as a major threat to freedom of speech and media pluralism in South Korea, a view particular articulated by interviewees supporting the progressive party. While the new media were mostly positively evaluated by our interviewees in 2008, critics have pointed out that the Lee Myung-bak government imposed censorship on the internet media by filing defamation lawsuits against journalists, requiring real-name registration, exercising content regulation in the name of national security (Haggard and You, 2015; You, 2015) .
Our interviews also reveal that distorted media representation and hyper-adversarialism motivated by political bias and competition considerably undermined the possibility of establishing a settled politician-journalist relationship governed by mutually accepted norms and routines (e.g. balanced media coverage for journalists and daily management of negative media coverage for politicians) in South Korea. The circumstances worsen with the media's increasing sensationalism developed in a market environment, resulting in increased political 26 news coverage in political scandals, corruption charges of politicians, and party in-fights (also see Baek et al., 2016) . and personalising political leaders (Baek et al., 2016) . While the setbacks in press freedom experienced during Lee Myung-bak's presidency undermined some of the positive evaluations made by our interviewees in 2008, previous achievements in consolidating South Korea's democracy cannot be overlooked. The achievements as well as the setbacks suggest that South Korean's democratic transition resembles 'a circle rather a straight line', as the transitional trajectories observed by Voltmer in other new democracies (Voltmer, 2013: 220) .
Notes
1 Park Cheung-hee engineered rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, but was accused of suppressing in a brutal fashion dissidents and human rights.
2 In this paper, we follow Pfetsch and Voltmer (2004; 2012) to use 'orientation' to refer to understanding, perceptions and role expectations of politicians and journalists regarding democratic institutions and processes;
and we use 'political affiliation' to refer to ideas, values and beliefs associated with political groups based on different ideologies, for instance the conservative or progressive parties.
